Bermuda: Americas Restructuring Review 2026

Legal framework

Bermuda is an overseas territory of the United Kingdom and its legal system is based on English common law, comprising statute and case law. Decisions of the English courts are not binding on a Bermuda court, although they are highly persuasive. The decisions of the Privy Council, however, are generally binding on the Bermuda courts, unless they are based on a reference from a jurisdiction with considerably different statutory provisions and policies. The Privy Council is Bermuda’s highest appellate court and sits in London.

Bermuda’s insolvency landscape

Bermuda’s insolvency law statutory framework consists of statute and common law. The principal statutory provisions governing corporate insolvency and restructuring are contained in Part XIII of the Companies Act 1981 (Companies Act) and are supported by the Companies (Winding-Up) Rules 1982 (the Winding-Up Rules).^[1] The Companies Act is based on the English Companies Act 1948 and the Companies Winding-Up Rules are based on the English Companies (Winding-Up) Rules 1949.^[2] No substantive changes have been made to Part XIII of the Companies Act and the Winding-Up Rules since they were enacted, although there have been minor amendments.

At the heart of Bermuda insolvency law is the pari passu treatment of unsecured creditors; that is, where a company has insufficient assets to satisfy its debts to unsecured creditors, each unsecured creditor would receive an equal distribution on a rateable basis according to the quantum of their claim.^[3] Secured creditors are generally unaffected by insolvency proceedings in Bermuda as they may enforce their security outside of the proceedings in accordance with the terms of the governing security instrument (although they have standing to present winding-up petitions).^[4]

A key feature of Bermuda insolvency law is that the Companies Act provides the ability to challenge, and, in some cases, set aside, certain transactions executed by companies prior to entering into insolvency proceedings. This includes:

• Fraudulent preference: a transaction by a company with a view to giving a creditor preference over other creditors will be void if entered into within a period of six months ending on the presentation of a petition for the winding-up of the company.
• Fraudulent conveyance: a transaction by a company, entered into at an undervalue, with the dominant purpose of putting property beyond the reach of a person or class of persons who is making (or may make) a claim against the company, may be challenged and declared void.
• Invalid floating charge: a floating charge granted by a company within 12 months of the commencement of the winding-up of the company will be void, except to the amount of any cash paid to the company subsequently or at the time of creation of the charge in consideration for its creation, unless it is proved that the company was solvent immediately after the charge’s creation.
• Invalid dispositions: any disposition of a company’s property after the presentation of a petition or adoption of a shareholders’ resolution for the winding-up of a company, is void unless the court orders otherwise if the company is subsequently ordered to be wound up by the court

Another key element of the Bermuda insolvency landscape is the willingness of the Bermuda court to work in tandem with, and to lend assistance to, foreign courts and Bermuda companies having interests in other jurisdictions where there is a substantial international creditor or asset base.

Corporate insolvency and rescue procedures

The primary insolvency and rescue procedures available under Bermuda law are:

• liquidation under the supervision of the court, commonly referred to as ‘compulsory liquidation’ or ‘compulsory winding-up’;
• provisional liquidation for the purpose of restructuring; and
• schemes of arrangement.

Compulsory liquidation

In Bermuda, a creditor seeking to liquidate a debtor company typically applies to the court for a winding-up order, claiming either the company’s inability to pay its debts or that it is just and equitable to wind up the company. The winding-up process can be initiated by any one or more of the following:

• the company itself;
• creditors, including any contingent or prospective creditors;^[5]
• contributories, subject to certain restrictions; and
• the Bermuda Monetary Authority (or the applicable regulator) in the case of a regulated entity.

To begin proceedings, a winding-up petition is filed with the Supreme Court, supported by an affidavit. While it is common to attach proof of the debt, it is not required. After the court sets a hearing date, the petition must be served on the company’s registered office. Prior to the hearing, the petitioner must file a certificate of compliance, confirming the petition has been properly filed, served and advertised.

Anyone wishing to appear at the hearing of the petition must notify the petitioner by 4pm on the day before the hearing of the petition, failing which they must seek court approval to appear. At the hearing of the petition, the Court can grant, dismiss or adjourn the petition, or make another suitable order. If unopposed, a winding-up order may be issued at the first hearing. If opposed, the court usually adjourns the petition to allow the parties time to prepare for a contested hearing.

The court may also adjourn a winding-up petition to facilitate a proposed restructuring by the company with the assistance of a court-appointed insolvency practitioner known as a ‘provisional liquidator’ (further discussed in this article). It is now well established that adjournments can be granted to facilitate a proposed restructuring by provisional liquidators. As stated by Kawaley CJ in Z-OBEE Holdings Ltd, section 170 of the Companies Act (Power of Court to appoint liquidators) has ‘for almost 20 years been construed as empowering this court to appoint a provisional liquidator with powers limited to implementing a restructuring rather than displacing the management altogether pending a winding up of the respondent company’. It is unlikely that the court would grant a stay of winding-up proceedings, save in exceptional circumstances.

If the court makes a winding-up order (whether at the first hearing or a subsequent hearing), the company’s operations will immediately come to an end. The directors’ power to manage the company ceases and a court-appointed liquidator is empowered to wind up the company’s affairs.^[6] Once appointed, the liquidator will be equipped with a wide array of powers to ensure that the liquidation proceeds in an orderly fashion and in accordance with the statutory regime, but must obtain the sanction of the court or the committee of inspection before taking certain actions; for example, deciding to bring or defend legal proceedings on behalf of the company. Upon the final distribution of the assets to the creditors or the members, the liquidator must obtain an order from the court for the dissolution of the company.

Provisional liquidation

Provisional liquidation in Bermuda is the appointment of a liquidator other than for the immediate winding up of the company. A provisional liquidator will be nominated by one or more of the parties. The court must accept the credentials of the nominees who, by custom and practice, will be insolvency practitioners.

There are two scenarios where an order for provisional liquidation will be made:

• provisional liquidation on a ‘light-touch’ basis: where there is a prospect of rescuing an insolvent company through restructuring without the displacement of all of the board’s executive functions;^[7] or
• provisional liquidation on ‘full powers basis’: where it is necessary for the court to appoint an officer to protect and prevent a dissipation of the company’s assets in the intervening period between the filing of a petition and the making of a winding-up order.^[8]

Provisional liquidation on a light-touch basis

The first type of provisional liquidation is a distinct feature of Bermuda’s restructuring landscape. Where a company is insolvent, instead of making a winding-up order to liquidate the company, the Bermuda court often appoints provisional liquidators with certain, limited powers, known as light-touch powers whose primary focus is to assist the company to explore the merits of a restructuring plan.^[9] This appointment is by far the most common form of provisional liquidation in Bermuda and also the principal rescue procedure in Bermuda.

In a light-touch provisional liquidation, a company may continue its business operations as usual, pending the implementation of a restructuring plan. This would normally occur where the court is satisfied that a restructuring will produce a better result than a winding up for creditors.

The Bermuda court has used provisional liquidation as a tool to restructure the affairs of a company, preserve value in a business and provide a platform for distressed companies to recover – which together promotes the sustainability and success of cross-border business. Provisional liquidation is often seen as a preliminary step to achieving a restructuring by way of a scheme of arrangement. The provisional liquidators draw on their expertise to work with the company to develop restructuring proposals. Crucially, a provisional liquidator can liaise with and advise the creditors of the company candidly on the merits and viability of restructuring proposals. Creditors can rely on the advice of provisional liquidators in the knowledge that they have a duty to advance the creditors’ interests above all else as independent officers of the court.

The provisional liquidation process allows for the possibility of debtor-in-possession financing arrangements or other restructuring funding solutions. Such financing solutions, approved by the court and monitored by provisional liquidators, can provide immediate liquidity to support ongoing operations during the restructuring process. This financial flexibility is typically unavailable in straightforward security enforcement scenarios, potentially leading to deterioration of asset value during enforcement. To that end, a scheme of arrangement is not the only means by which restructuring transactions can be effected. Provisional liquidators may use their powers, or powers exercisable with the sanction of the court, to enter into a transaction without a scheme. This may be a more appropriate course of action where, for instance, all counterparties to a transaction and all stakeholders with an economic interest in the company consent to the transaction. Under these circumstances, there is no need for a scheme to bind dissenting members of any class. An example of such a transaction is the recent cross-border debt restructuring of Afiniti Limited (discussed further in this article).

The light-touch provisional liquidation operates in a similar manner to Chapter 11 in the United States or administration in the UK but with even greater flexibility. There are few statutory requirements to be satisfied before a provisional liquidator is appointed save for that a sole liquidator must reside in Bermuda (and in the case of joint liquidators, at least one must be resident) and their credentials must be accepted by the court. The function and roles of a provisional liquidator are set out in the order appointing the provisional liquidators, which can be tailored to suit the particular situation without statutory constraints.

A key feature of provisional liquidation is the automatic stay triggered by the appointment of provisional liquidators, which prevents any enforcement action, or the commencement or continuation of legal proceedings against the Company. Creditors are protected, given the independent oversight of provisional liquidators who, as officers of the court, are under a duty to act in the best interests of creditors. By participating in provisional liquidation, creditors may benefit from court-sanctioned mechanisms that facilitate negotiations with other classes of creditors, thereby achieving broader consensus and reducing litigation risk. Court supervision also assures stakeholders that transactions conducted during provisional liquidation are transparent, equitable and subject to judicial oversight, mitigating the risk of subsequent challenges.

A provisional liquidation may be commenced alone or in combination with another process in Bermuda or abroad, for example, in combination with a US bankruptcy, an English restructuring plan or a Bermudian scheme of arrangement.^[10] The combination of restructuring processes in multiple jurisdictions can be a very powerful tool, as demonstrated in the Noble Group case (further discussed in this article).

Provisional liquidation on a full powers basis

In circumstances where it is shown to be necessary and in the interest of creditors or the public, a provisional liquidator may be appointed on an ex parte basis to take control of and safeguard the assets. A court typically appoints a provisional liquidator on a full powers basis where there are serious regulatory concerns, a suspicion of fraud or cogent evidence demonstrating a likelihood that the directors may dispose of assets if tipped off about an impending winding-up petition. This form of provisional liquidation is known as provisional liquidation on a full powers basis, contrasted with provisional liquidation on a light-touch basis as explained above.

A debtor can continue to trade during insolvency proceedings. However, this should be with the court’s blessing as, unless the court orders otherwise, if a company is wound up, any disposition of the company’s property after the date on which the winding-up petition was presented (to commence the insolvency or rescue proceedings) is void.

The timeline for completion of the insolvency proceedings varies and will largely depend on the complexity of the proceedings; for example, the extent of the company’s assets and liabilities, the creditor profile and any ongoing litigation or regulatory matters.

In both provisional liquidation scenarios, subject to the court’s or committee of inspection’s sanction, expenses incurred by the liquidator in carrying on the business will be paid out of the assets of the company as expenses of the liquidation in priority to other unsecured creditors.

Schemes of arrangement

A scheme of arrangement is the only statutory court-supervised reorganisation procedure in Bermuda, provided for in sections 99 and 100 of the Companies Act. A scheme of arrangement may be initiated by the company, any member or creditor of the company or, where applicable, a liquidator who has been appointed in relation to the company (as explained above). A proposed scheme must represent a compromise or arrangement between the company and its creditors or members, or any classes thereof.

Proceedings are commenced by applying to the Bermuda court for directions to convene meetings with the various classes of creditors or shareholders who will be affected by the scheme’s proposals. Once the meetings have been convened and the statutory voting thresholds have been met, a further application is made to the court to approve or sanction the scheme.

Classes of creditors are determined by the requirement for a class to be confined to those persons whose rights (as affected by the proposed scheme) are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest. For a scheme to be presented to the Bermuda courts for sanction, each class must approve the scheme by both:

• simple majority (in number) of those present and voting; and
• 75 per cent in value of debt of those present and voting.

Cross-class cramdown of a dissenting class of creditors or members is not permitted in a Bermuda scheme of arrangement. If any single class of affected creditors or members does not approve the scheme of arrangement, the court cannot sanction the scheme.

Consequences for directors of insolvent companies

In circumstances where a company is insolvent or is likely to become insolvent, the directors’ duty to act in the best interests of the company will include a duty to have regard to the interests of the company’s creditors (Creditor Duty). There is no bright-line test as to when, and to what extent, the Creditor Duty is triggered; the less the likelihood of the company escaping an insolvent winding-up, the greater the degree to which the directors’ duties are owed to the company’s creditors and, if insolvent liquidation becomes inevitable, the creditors’ interests are predominant.

According to the recent UK judgment delivered in Hunt v Singh, it appears that some form of knowledge of a company’s insolvency (actual or constructive) by the directors is necessary to engage the Creditor Duty, even where the company is actually insolvent at the relevant time. Furthermore, where a company is faced with a claim to a current liability, such that its solvency is dependent on successfully challenging that claim, then the Creditor Duty is triggered if the directors ‘know or ought to know that there is at least a real prospect of the challenge failing’. Knowledge of a real risk that a company’s challenge to the claim may fail, therefore, equates to knowledge that it is the creditors that are potentially currently being affected by the directors’ actions and decisions.

The court has power to assess damages against any director or officer who misapplies, retains or otherwise becomes liable for any money or property of the company or who commits any misfeasance or breach of trust. A liquidator may also pursue claims for breach of duty against directors and officers. It is common practice, however, for Bermuda companies to indemnify directors and officers for their actions and omissions, which operates to prevent actions against directors or officers who enjoy such an indemnity, save in cases of fraud or dishonesty.

Generally, parent companies are liable only to the extent that any shares are not paid up, unless there is some other, freestanding course of action.

Expedited restructurings

The Companies Act does not provide for an expedited reorganisation, such as a reorganisation by way of a pre-pack arrangement. However, as a matter of practice, a reorganisation may be informally negotiated with a liquidator prior to their appointment on the informal understanding that the liquidator will approve the pre-negotiated arrangement once appointed. This type of informal arrangement will have a similar effect to a pre-package deal, but the details of the arrangement will be bespoke to the particular circumstances of the case.

Receivership

Receivers are generally appointed by secured creditors pursuant to the terms of a security agreement. The function of the receiver is to realise the relevant secured assets of the company for the benefit of the security holder. Assets of a company that have been validly secured as security for a company’s indebtedness are exempted from the claims of creditors in insolvency. On completion of the receivership, therefore, there can be a winding up of the assets not realised by the receiver for the benefit of the company’s unsecured creditors.

There is a separate insolvency regime that applies to segregated accounts companies incorporated in Bermuda under the Segregated Accounts Companies Act 2000 (sometimes referred to as protected cell companies or segregated portfolio companies in other jurisdictions). This regime provides for the appointment of receivers over the segregated accounts (or cells) of the segregated accounts company that are unable to meet their liabilities as they fall due. A liquidator may be appointed over a segregated account company’s general account if it is insolvent. There are relatively few statutory rules underpinning this regime when compared to the winding-up regime that applies to limited liability companies incorporated in Bermuda. It is assumed that the Bermuda court would model its approach to the winding up of a segregated accounts company on the court’s established practice in relation to limited liability companies.

Bankruptcy

Corporate insolvency generally refers to the winding-up regime under Part XIII of the Companies Act and the Winding-Up Rules. Bankruptcy is a term that only applies to individual insolvency and limited partnerships, the latter being the corporate vehicle regularly used for investment funds.

Creditor-friendly jurisdiction

Bermuda is considered a creditor-friendly jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that there is no statutory debtor in possession mechanism to prevent enforcement of security in insolvency proceedings, and this traditionally has been the case, with the Companies Act modernising and enhancing the restructuring and insolvency framework.

Secured creditors are generally free to enforce their security against debtors outside of an insolvency process, including a liquidation. Unsecured creditors can seek a compulsory liquidation of the relevant debtor company and its assets can be applied in satisfaction of debts.

The court recognises the importance of promoting a culture of rescue (where possible) and strives to assist companies in financial distress where it can. The court will however prioritise the interests of creditors, recognising that rescue attempts do not always maximise creditor value, that sophisticated creditors are often best positioned to decide what serves their commercial interests and that, ultimately, a creditor petitioning for the winding-up of an insolvent company has a prima facie right to a winding-up order. Notwithstanding a petitioning creditor’s prima facie right to a winding-up order, the court may exercise its discretion and decline to make a winding-up order if it is opposed by a majority of creditors and there is a good reason not to order the company to be wound up; for instance, if there is a real prospect of a restructuring that would result in a better outcome for creditors. The court will always look to achieve a creditor-friendly outcome and can adopt a flexible approach, as evidenced by the court’s development of the provisional liquidation regime.

The court is particularly alert to the realities and complexities of international commerce and will cooperate with courts of foreign jurisdictions where there is a Bermudian connection; for example, the company is incorporated in Bermuda, has assets in Bermuda or does business in Bermuda.

Hallmark of provisional liquidation – Noble Group Limited

The value of provisional liquidation was highlighted in the high-profile restructuring of Noble Group Limited in 2018. Noble Group, incorporated in Bermuda and listed on the Singapore Exchange, was one of the world’s largest commodity traders with operations across London, Hong Kong and Singapore. The group faced severe financial challenges due to the drop in commodity prices between 2014 and 2016, with pre-restructuring debt exceeding US$3 billion.

To avoid liquidation, Noble’s directors pursued a complex restructuring involving a debt-for-equity swap, transferring assets to newly incorporated subsidiaries under a new holding company, New Noble. Scheme creditors were to receive new debt instruments and 70 per cent equity in the new group, with the balance split between existing shareholders (20 per cent) and management (10 per cent). A key aim was securing new hedging and trade finance facilities worth US$800 million, provided by a finance creditor and scheme creditors guaranteeing the facility in exchange for senior debt.

Initially, Noble sought to restructure through parallel schemes of arrangement governed by English and Bermuda law. Before launching the English scheme, regarded as the lead scheme, the company shifted its main office from Hong Kong to London. Both schemes were approved by most creditors and sanctioned by courts in England and Wales and Bermuda in November 2018, followed by recognition from the US Bankruptcy Court via Chapter 15.

However, the Singaporean authorities blocked the transfer of Noble’s listing to New Noble due to an ongoing investigation into Noble and one of its subsidiaries. Unable to implement the scheme as planned, Noble’s directors sought the appointment of light-touch provisional liquidators, who (unlike the directors) would not be constrained as a result of the investigation. On 14 December 2018, the Bermuda court appointed a provisional liquidator with powers to oversee the restructuring in the creditors’ best interest.

The provisional liquidator facilitated the transfer of assets to New Noble, despite the loss of the Singapore listing. The restructuring was ultimately successful, preventing Noble’s compulsory liquidation and ensuring creditors received better returns than they would have in those circumstances.

Developments in provisional liquidation – Chishti v Afiniti Ltd

Chishti v Afiniti Ltd was a recent example of a company successfully availing itself of a restructuring plan through the use of light touch provisional liquidation.

In this case, the provisional liquidators (JPLs) of Afiniti Limited (Company), the Bermuda holding company of the technology company Afiniti Inc, sought sanctions from the Bermuda Supreme Court under sections 175 (1) (e) and 175 (2) (a) of the Bermuda Companies Act 1981 to exercise their powers of compromise, or as applicable, sale to implement a restructuring transaction (Transaction) whereby effectively the whole of the assets and undertaking of the Company were to be transferred and/or sold to a new company ultimately owned and controlled by the secured lenders.

The evidence showed that the Company was profoundly insolvent on a balance sheet basis, on the brink of cash-flow insolvency and would collapse if a restructuring were not achieved before the Company’s cash resources ran out.

The JPLs’ application for sanction was supported by the Company, acting by its directors whose management function continued under the light touch provisional liquidation, and by its secured creditors. The application was opposed by Afiniti’s founder and purported contingent creditor, Mr Chishti, on the basis that the Company and the JPLs should try to achieve a sale to a third party instead of entering into the Transaction and the court should conduct a trial on the issue as to whether the terms of the Transaction were based on a proper understanding of the Company’s business and on a Valuation Report, which he viewed as technically wrong. Mr Chishti also opposed the grant of the sanctions to the JPLs on the same grounds on which he sought the adjournment. He sought either an adjournment for a valuation trial or a refusal of the relief applied for, which he said could not be granted without a further testing of the valuation, following disclosure and cross-examination (to a great or lesser extent, depending on the test to be applied).

In November 2024, the Bermuda Supreme Court rejected Mr Chishti’s submissions and granted the sanction order. The Court held that the test for sanction in a ‘type 1 case’ concerning the power of compromise was focused on what was in the best interests of creditors as a whole, and that the test for sanction in a ‘type 2 case’ concerning the power of sale was focused on the JPLs’ genuine and rational belief that proper value had been obtained.

Moelis, a global investment bank, conducted an extensive fund-raising process that explored a broad range of financing solutions. No equity finance was raised, and one refinancing offer had been received for part of the secured debt, the remainder to be subordinated. Against this backdrop, the court was satisfied that the JPLs could rely on the valuation report, and that none of the criticisms of the valuation report advanced by Mr Chishti were persuasive. The court found that the JPLs had reasonable grounds for believing that the Transaction would be in the best interests of the creditors and the Company, including its employees, and on that basis considered that both the type 1 and type 2 tests were met.

On 21 March 2025, the Supreme Court refused Mr Chishti’s application for leave to appeal the sanction order to the Court of Appeal of Bermuda. Ultimately, the court was not satisfied that Mr Chishti’s challenges to the court’s decision had a realistic prospect of success.

This case provides useful guidance as to the extent to which the Bermuda Court will weigh up the objections of a disgruntled creditor against the obvious and discernible benefits to both the Company and its creditors as a whole.

Cross-border support

There are two common types of cross-border support cases in Bermuda. First, cases where a winding-up proceeding in Bermuda runs alongside an insolvency process in another country, often to restructure a Bermuda-registered company. In several instances, Bermuda companies involved in Chapter 11 proceedings in the United States have seen the Bermuda court appoint provisional liquidators with light-touch powers to supervise the directors and report to the Bermuda court. The Bermuda court generally defers to Chapter 11 proceedings and supports the reorganisation plan. This approach provides independent oversight through provisional liquidators, focused on creditor protection, and triggers a stay of proceedings against the company.

Second, cases arise where foreign liquidators request assistance from the Bermuda court in an ongoing liquidation outside Bermuda, such as ordering Bermuda entities to provide information or compelling individuals to give evidence. The Bermuda court often exercises its common law power to assist, provided that the foreign court could grant similar relief.

The Bermuda court generally cannot wind up overseas companies, except in limited statutory circumstances. In a multinational group, this means the court lacks jurisdiction to wind up companies domiciled outside Bermuda. However, liquidators appointed to wind up a Bermuda company may initiate ancillary insolvency proceedings in jurisdictions such as England and Wales or Hong Kong, which allow such proceedings. There have been relatively few Bermuda judgments considering the scope of assistance that might be given in support of foreign proceedings.

Under the Reciprocal Judgements Act 1958 (Reciprocal Judgements Act), a judgment of a superior court in the United Kingdom or other designated common law jurisdiction may be registered as a judgment in the Bermuda court to the extent the foreign judgment is final and conclusive as between the parties and is for a fixed sum of money (not being in respect of taxes or in respect of fines or penalties).

Under Bermuda’s common law, the Bermuda court may, subject to certain requirements, recognise judgments from foreign jurisdictions not otherwise qualifying for registration under the Reciprocal Judgments Act for a liquidated sum by way of summary judgment.

Bermuda has not adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments and is not currently considering its adoption. Foreign liquidators may apply for recognition in Bermuda pursuant to Bermuda’s common law and the principles of comity.

Looking ahead

Bermuda continues to prove itself as a reliable and stable destination for restructuring, maintaining a sophisticated and diligent approach to corporate structure and regulation. The jurisdiction offers flexible and innovative cross-border restructuring solutions for distressed multinational companies, while keeping creditor interests as a top priority.

In 2024, there was an increase in debt restructuring activity, both in and out of court, reflecting creditors’ continuing belief that rescue procedures can preserve value and demonstrating creditors’ confidence in Bermuda as a restructuring destination.

Creditor forbearance does, however, have its limits. There is a noticeable rise in formal enforcement and insolvency actions in Bermuda, with a number of cases arising as a result of prevailing economic conditions, including currency exposure, commodity volatility and sector-specific deterioration, for example, in the shipping, retail and real estate sectors. Creditors recognise that financially distressed businesses often face multiple enforcement actions. This can lead to a perception of a first-mover advantage, as the creditor initiating a petition may have more control over the timing and early stages of the insolvency process compared to other creditors.

As a result, we anticipate that Bermuda will continue to be an active and significant jurisdiction for rescue, restructuring and insolvency proceedings. Considering Bermuda’s well-established position as an international financial centre and a preferred place of incorporation for multinational corporations, we anticipate that the trends we have identified will persist well into the foreseeable future.

There are proposals to create a new restructuring process involving the appointment of a court-appointed restructuring officer. While there would be considerable overlap between the roles of a court-appointed restructuring officer and provisional liquidator, there would be a greater focus on restructuring, clear criteria for appointment and a focus on prompt reporting on the feasibility of a restructuring proposal.

There are also proposals to reduce the threshold for approval of a scheme of arrangement from 75 per cent of each class to 66 per cent of each class.

The time frame for the introduction of these reforms is, at present, uncertain.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Sam Riihiluoma and John Riihiluoma for their assistance in writing this article.

Endnotes